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Although compensation and rehabilitation schemes exist to assist health and 
recovery of people injured in road crashes, evidence shows they can also have a 
negative impact on the health and wellbeing of injured people. Some 
compensation system elements, including complicated and adversarial claims 
processes, poor communication between claims managers and injured people, 
and prioritisation of financial viability of the system rather than health of 
individuals, can result in lower levels of perceived fairness and poorer health 
among injured people. Ironically, these same policy and management actions 
designed to protect the viability of the system can also result in poorer overall 
system performance. To ensure injury compensation and rehabilitation systems 
perform their important role as facilitators of recovery for injured people, we 
suggest they should focus on i) a fundamental shift away from a ‘defensive’ 
approach prioritising short-term financial targets toward a proactive model of 
client recovery, ii) improving communication in claims management and 
medical assessment processes, and iii) introducing less adversarial aspects of 
overall scheme design. Together, it is suggested these elements can assist to 
improve health of injured people and the overall performance of injury 
rehabilitation and compensation systems. 
  
 





In this chapter we describe the role of injury compensation and rehabilitation systems in 
optimising the health of people in road injury compensation and rehabilitation processes. The 
chapter is divided into three parts. In part I, the role and impacts of compensation and 
rehabilitation systems are described. We discuss the potential and importance of compensation 
systems in relation to the WHO Decade for Action for Road Safety (§1), and the challenges of 
operating schemes set up under these various frameworks when viewed from the perspective 
of trying to produce ‘high performance’ health systems as judged by WHO criteria (§2). Part II 
addresses the effect of compensation systems on health. This part involves the compensation 
scheme structures and coverage (§3), a discussion of the literature investigating compensation 
and rehabilitation system design affecting behaviour and consequently the performance of 
schemes (§4), and the policy and claims management changes influencing scheme performance 
and the outcomes (§5). In part III, we work towards an ideal compensation & rehabilitation 
system. This part holds the methodological limitations, advances and implications to test policy 
and management scenarios (§6), and a summary of best practice scheme design based on 
presented information, and existing knowledge of schemes from a theoretical and practical 
perspective and presentation of an ‘ideal’ scheme schematic and description (§7). The chapter 
is finalised with a conclusion (§8). 
 
 
THE ROLE AND POSITION OF COMPENSATION SYSTEMS 
 
1. Road safety, health care and compensation systems  
 
In the twenty years between the 1950’s and 1970’s, private motor vehicle travel tripled across 
the North America, Europe and Australasia. Whilst this era revolutionised population mobility, 
it also brought considerable social challenges, including a significant human and financial toll 
generated by road deaths and injuries. Though many western countries have since witnessed 
general declines in the rate of road death and injury per capita since these peaks, globally, road 
trauma continues to climb. Today, more than 1.25 million people are killed, and a further 50 
million people are injured in road crashes around the world each year (World Health 
Organization, 2009). Rapid motorisation throughout China, India and African nations sees road 
trauma poised to become the world’s fifth leading cause of disability by 2030 (World Health 
Organization, 2013). Whilst the uptake of private motor vehicles continues apace in these 
developing nations, without the creation of adequate injury insurance, compensation and 
rehabilitation services, people injured in road crashes may face significant and ongoing 
physical, psychological and financial hardship. Further, without the development of such 
services, existing health and transport systems that need to cope with this emerging burden will 
come under increasing stress (World Health Organization, 2016). 
 
Fundamentally, road injury insurance, compensation and rehabilitation services developed in 
response to a problem; one caused by the uptake and sometimes side-effects of high-speed, 
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private motorised transport. Road trauma began to place such demands on existing health 
system resources that countries and jurisdictions were forced to develop dedicated road injury 
schemes and systems funded through insurance premiums. In Australia and many other nations 
where the population of motor-vehicles continues to rival the population of people (Australian 
Bureau of Statistics, 2017), these schemes collectively gather and distribute over US$4 billion 
in emergency, hospital, and rehabilitation costs for the nearly 1300 people who are killed and 
50,000 people who are injured each year. 
 
When designed and operated well, road injury insurance, compensation and rehabilitation 
systems play a critical role in protecting and rehabilitating injured people while ensuring 
transport and health systems are able to continue to operate and perform effectively. Indeed, 
whilst globally renowned for its pioneering and hard-hitting road safety commercials that first 
began airing in the 1980’s, the Transport Accident Commission in the Australian state of 
Victoria has expressed a recent goal of becoming the ‘world’s leading social insurer’ (Victorian 
Transport Accident Commission, 2016). But ultimately, what will that mean? What 
benchmarks for revenue, prevention, operation, treatment, support and outcomes for injured 
clients and the community at large will lead system administrators to consider they have 
achieved this goal? These are important questions as the targets that systems set themselves, 
and the structures they set up to achieve them, have significant implications for the health of 
millions of people who potentially interact and pass through such systems each year. When 
structured and delivered well, injury compensation and rehabilitation systems can provide 
injured people with the support and assistance required to return to their pre-injury lives and 
levels of productivity. However, when delivered poorly, they can also have undesired, negative 
effect on recovery and ultimate post-injury health outcomes.  
 
The years 2011 to 2020 have been nominated by the World Health Organization as the ‘Decade 
of Action for Road Safety’ (United Nations Road Safety Collaboration, 2011). This focus 
provides an unprecedented opportunity for countries to develop robust, systems-oriented 
approaches to tackle the decade’s five underlying pillars: 1) Road Safety Management, 2) Safer 
Roads, 3) Safer Vehicles, 4) Safer Road Users, and lastly 5) Post-Crash Response systems, 
including compensation, health, and rehabilitation systems (World Health Organization, 2016). 
However, while models for road safety management, safer roads, vehicles and road users 
abound, comprehensive understanding of what elements combine to distinguish between high 
and low performance post-crash response systems (Pillar 5) is lacking. Countries and 
jurisdictions in the midst of designing, developing, or re-imagining their own systems require 
readily agreed-upon models and themes upon which to construct their own systems. In this 
chapter, we seek to provide such guidance.  
  
2. Challenges of managing and operating injury compensation and rehabilitation 
systems 
 
Considerable effort has been spent during the past two decades to create common frameworks 
for assessing health system performance, of which compensation and rehabilitation systems are 
a part. These have focused on understanding the boundaries of health system responsibilities, 
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the functions they perform, and how these functions translate into achievement of health system 
goals and outcomes (Duckett & Willcox, 2015; Murray & Evans, 2006). In essence, health 
systems are required to balance multiple objectives, which may not always be compatible. 
 
A useful framework for understanding the challenges facing management and operation of 
health systems comes from Murray and Frenk (2000) who describe the functions of health 
systems as comprising stewardship, resource creation, financing, and service provision. Core 
goals of the health system are then defined as improved performance across three areas: 1) 
responsiveness to community expectations, 2) fairness in financial contributions (personal and 
population), and 3) overall population health (See Figure 1). The World Health Organization 
(2000) considers that combined high levels of performance across these three elements is 
indicative of a well-functioning health care system. 
 
 
Figure 1. Conceptual model of health system performance as defined by Murray & Frenk, 2000 
and adopted by the World Health Organization (2000). 
 
That insurance, compensation and rehabilitation systems should have a primary goal of 
‘improving health’ of injured clients seems obvious. However, this goal is not always 
straightforward when debate over the potentially iatrogenic nature of many individual health 
system structures and procedures remain. For example, debate continues regarding the relative 
harms and benefits of both breast and prostate cancer screening (Bell et al., 2014; The, 2012), 
as well as in the delivery of psychotropic medication for illness such as schizophrenia and 
depression (Correll, Detraux, De Lepeleire, & De Hert, 2015). Indeed, the provision of 
‘healthcare’ itself remains a cause of significant ill-health (Greenfield et al., 2015). 
Compensation and rehabilitation systems are not immune from such concerns, with researchers 
having previously argued that the negative effects of receiving health services through injury 
compensation schemes are consistent enough to be compared to the consistency of relationship 
between smoking and lung cancer (Gabbe, Harris, Collie, & Cameron, 2010). 
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However, regardless of actual outcomes, it is at least not an overt goal of road injury insurance, 
compensation and rehabilitation systems to purposefully create poorer health among already 
vulnerable, injured people. It also makes little sense that communities would continue to 
financially, culturally, or politically support insurers, governments, or schemes (public or 
private) that presided over systems that consistently cause harm. Those that do through 
mismanagement, error, purposeful withholding of benefits, or otherwise often attract significant 
negative community and/or state attention, leading to interventions including individual review, 
regulation or in extreme cases, complete system overhaul (Moszynski, 2015; Schoen et al., 
2004; Stylianou, 2011). 
 
Whilst few researchers in the area of injury insurance, compensation and rehabilitation systems 
have specifically identified Murray and Frenk’s (2000) health system performance framework, 
elements contained within its second element, ‘responsiveness to expectations’, have received 
considerable attention in recent years under various guises - especially in the area of 
compensation. Responsiveness to expectations relates to health services that exclude physical 
or psychological treatment but still contribute to the overall quality of patients’ experience of 
interactions with the health system. What could broadly be described as an extension of 
‘bedside manner’ (M. McCarthy, 2014) to the level of the organisation, Murray and Frenk 
(2000) described responsiveness as made up of two elements; ‘respect for persons’, and ‘client 
orientation’. Respect for persons is in turn comprised of respect for dignity, respect for 
autonomy, and respect for confidentiality. Similarly, client orientation includes components of 
prompt attention to health needs, provision of basic amenities, access to social support, and 
patient choice (e.g., of treating physician and/or institution). These elements are also reflected 
in more contemporary literature regarding the potential direct and indirect benefits of ‘patient-
centred care’ (Fahey & NicLiam, 2014; Richards, Coulter, & Wicks, 2015). Further, and as 
Figure 1 illustrates, they are also considered to be directly related to improved patient health 
outcomes.  
 
Whereas a transactional model of health care based on clear hierarchical structures and focus 
on activities directly related to ‘improving health’ as defined above has dominated western 
healthcare throughout the 19th and 20th century, the concept of health system responsiveness, 
incorporating concepts of patient-centred care (Mead & Bower, 2002), has now moved to the 
centre of contemporary thought and practice (Coulter, 2002; Richards, Coulter, & Wicks, 
2015). Although consensus on exactly what constitutes patient-centred care remains somewhat 
elusive for theorists (Kitson, Marshall, Bassett, & Zeitz, 2013), there is general agreement that 
patient-centred and patient-oriented models require health care providers to become more 
participatory; traditional doctor-patient or administrator-patient power dynamics are therefore 
exchanged for a model of partnership, emphasising patient empowerment (Anderson & Funnell, 
2005) and information exchange between all players in the system. A more interactive, 
participatory environment affords injured patients the opportunity, within practical limits, to be 
involved in decision-making and direct their course of treatment. The patient must be provided 
with options to be engaged, consulted, effectively communicated with and informed of their 
options. In short, the patient has agency. 
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Advocates describe the benefits of adopting patient-oriented models as manifold, spanning 
reduced costs, improved health outcomes, reduced bed-days and time off work, greater general 
satisfaction with services, greater compliance with treatment, reduced medical errors, and 
reduced complaints and litigation (Fahey & NicLiam, 2014). However, practical realities 
remain in relation to the allocation and availability of finite human and financial resources 
within health care systems that adopt patient-oriented models of care, pressures of which can 
still displace best intentions to improve responsiveness (Coulter, 2002; Theodosius, 2008). For 
example, the predictability and structure of workflows for staff can be adversely affected when 
patient-centred communication protocols are introduced (O'Leary et al., 2016). In industrial 
medical models where health services are under increasing pressure to process more patients in 
less time with less money, the introduction of patient-oriented service protocols can be viewed 
by staff and administrators as inefficient or simply ‘politically correct’, and therefore face 
significant barriers (Anderson & Funnell, 2005). Without continued monitoring and explication 
of resounding benefits of patient-oriented models for patients, staff, and administrators, health 
systems may return to more rudimentary functions or at least halt progression toward their 
optimised selves. 
 
Access to ‘reasonable’ costs of medical services are enshrined in some Australian state 
legislation for people injured in road traffic accidents (e.g., State Government of Victoria, 
2011). Levels of care considered ‘reasonable’, however have expanded rapidly since the 
original legislation was introduced, producing a requirement by injury insurers to specifically 
restrict access to some treatments in order to protect financial viability of the total system. 
Therefore, although effort is made to acknowledge the importance of health systems’ resistance 
to entertainment of patients’ occasional unrealistic service or treatment requests (Murray & 
Frenk, 2000), it is ultimately uncertain by whose measure ‘reasonable’ or ‘legitimate’ 
expectations should be judged if not by patients, themselves. It is important for injury 
compensation and rehabilitation services to therefore have a comprehensive understanding of 
the circumstances under which particular treatments or service requests will be accepted or 
denied, due to insufficient evidence of efficacy, cost, precedent, or otherwise.  
 
Community expectations of services are therefore not static at either an individual or population 
level, but may change over time in response to changing community demand, population norms, 
attributions of injury, levels of health, evidence, demographic characteristics, and time spent 
interacting with health services (Elbers et al., 2016; Thompson, Berk, O'Donnell, Stafford, & 
Nordfjaern, 2015). Despite such restrictions, the legislation is still subject to interpretation, and 
expectations continue to be re-set by precedent through processes of dispute resolution 
(O'Donnell, 2000) or tested in the courts when agreement between patients and the health 
system stewards reaches an impasse. Further, adversarial or simply unsatisfactory 
communication with health services or staff may have the effect of reducing trust and 
satisfaction more generally (Elbers, Akkermans, Lockwood, Craig, & Cameron, 2015; 
Fitzharris, Liu, Shourie, & Collie, 2013; Grant, O'Donnell, Spittal, Creamer, & Studdert, 2014; 




Such dynamic relationships between patient expectations and health care systems’ consequent 
responsiveness to changing community interpretations of ‘reasonableness’ suggests the 
existence of feedback loops that, without intervention, may drive patient expectations and 
health system responses ever higher. Conversely, these same feedback loops can act to drive 
total health system performance lower as systems seek to restrict costs through increased denial 
of services, reduce in-flow of clients through increasing barriers to entry, and reducing the cost 
of individual treatments or payments for non-medical compensation (e.g., common-law 
payments). Rightly or wrongly, such expectations can be encouraged by plaintiff solicitors 
whose roles as advocates for payment of reasonable damages to clients can create conditions 
for the development of adversarial relationships between clients and services that hinder both 
the speed and quality of client recovery. Added to the already poorer physical and mental health 
recoveries are lower levels of satisfaction experienced by clients who attribute responsibility 
for their accident to others (Elbers, Collie, & Akkermans, 2015; Gabbe et al., 2015; Thompson, 
Berk, O'Donnell, Nordfjaern, & Stafford, 2014; Thompson et al., 2015; Thompson, O'Donnell, 
Stafford, Nordfjaern, & Berk, 2014). All measures possible should be considered to reduce the 
negative impact of drawn-out adversarial relationships on clients; for whom the relative size of 
financial compensation also appears to provide little relief. 
 
Injury insurance, compensation, and rehabilitation systems are sub-components of the 
healthcare system. Consistent with WHO frameworks described above, they must balance 
responsiveness of the system to clients’ expectations alongside the financial viability of the 
system to optimise health outcomes for the broader population. These final years of the Decade 
of Action for Road Safety present an opportunity to optimise the design of compensation and 
rehabilitation systems. This focus could set in train conditions for optimising the physical, 
mental and functional health of injured clients, improving responsiveness of systems to clients’ 
non-medical needs, and ensure their ongoing financial viability.  
 
II. THE EFFECT OF COMPENSATION SYSTEMS ON HEALTH 
 
It was stated above that injury compensation and rehabilitation systems can provide injured 
people with the support and assistance to return to their pre-injury lives, but that they can also 
have an undesired, negative effect on recovery and ultimate post-injury health outcomes. In part 
II, we will elaborate and explain the impact of compensation systems on the health of injured 
people in more detail. The impact of the compensation process on health is discussed based on 
the current health research.   
 
3. The effect of the compensation system design  
 
Compensation systems can be divided broadly into fault-based schemes (which are also termed 
common law or tort law systems) and no-fault schemes1. The main difference is that in fault-
based schemes a claimant needs to be not at-fault for the incident in order to receive 
                                               
1 Variations exist. In a pure scheme, the scheme is either no-fault or fault-based. In a hybrid scheme, the basis is 
either fault- or no-fault, to which respectively no-fault or fault-based elements are added. In a choice scheme, 
people can choose whether they want either a no-fault or a fault-based scheme (Fronsko, 2001). 
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compensation, whereas in a no-fault scheme a claimant will be compensated regardless of who 
was at-fault. Other differences will be described further on in this paragraph. Generally, fault-
based schemes are more adversarial and less therapeutic compared to no-fault schemes (Lippel, 
1999). The likely impact of compensation system design (fault or no-fault) on health is 
supported by empirical studies investigating health and disability of injured people involved in 
different compensation systems. For example, injured people who lodged a no-fault claim in 
Victoria, Australia, considered the compensation process to be fairer and reported better health 
status compared to injured people who lodged a claim in a fault-based scheme in New South 
Wales2, Australia (Elbers et al., 2016). Compensation system design effects were also revealed 
in a study comparing Australian workers’ compensation systems and time off work (Collie, 
Lane, & McLeod, 2015). Workers in Victoria had significantly longer durations of time off 
work (13 weeks’ time loss) as compared to workers in Tasmania (7 weeks’ time loss) (Collie 
et al., 2015). Another study investigated a legislative change in NSW, removing financial 
compensation for “pain and suffering” for whiplash, introducing clinical practice guidelines for 
whiplash treatment, permitting earlier acceptance of whiplash compensation claims, and earlier 
access to treatment for all types of injury in NSW (Cameron et al., 2008). These changes led to 
an 8% decrease in disability in injured people after a traffic crash (Cameron et al., 2008). Again, 
another study investigating a legislative change from fault-based to no-fault also showed a 
decrease in whiplash symptoms, which the authors mainly attributed to the removal of pain and 
suffering (Cassidy et al., 2000) 
 
The negative effect of fault-based schemes on health is attributed to the fact that fault-based 
schemes involve more adversarial elements. The adversarial interactions mostly relate to the 
assessment of liability, medical examinations, determination of damages, and type of insurer 
(third-party or first-party; government or for profit). These adversarial interactions are 
elaborated upon below. 
 
Liability assessment is the assessment, conducted by the insurance company, to determine 
whether somebody else is liable for causing the accident. In a fault-based scheme the injured 
person has to prove that someone else was at-fault for causing the accident, in order to receive 
compensation. The liability assessment can be stressful for the injured person, having to provide 
evidence, to which the insurance company can contest. Discussions can arise in case the 
circumstances of the accident can be unclear, or if the injured person is partly at-fault. This will 
lead to a proportionate reduction of the amount of compensation due. The liability assessment 
causes a delay, because it often can take up to 3 months to make a decision. In contrast, in a no-
fault compensation scheme, compensation is available regardless of fault for the crash, meaning 
regardless of who caused the accident, so also for those who were at-fault. There are exceptions 
(e.g. injured people may not be eligible to claim compensation if they were involved in a 
criminal offence, such as drunk driving), but in general there is no discussion about liability in 
a no-fault scheme and the compensation process can start straight away.  
 
                                               
2 New South Wales has recently (2017) moved to a no-fault scheme 
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Medical examinations are another potential stressor. Medical examinations are conducted by 
medical assessors, to identify treatment needs, to establish the injured person’s functional 
capacity for return to work, or to determine the degree of impairment once maximum medical 
progress has been achieved (Kilgour, Kosny, Akkermans, & Collie, 2015). Medical 
assessments can be requested by the injured person or by the insurance company. Particularly 
in medical assessments requested by the insurance company, injured persons can get the 
impression that the doctor is attempting to trick them and test everything in order to dispute 
their claim (Kilgour et al., 2015). Medical examiners can add a substantial degree of emotional 
stress and overtax the physical capabilities of injured people (Kilgour et al., 2015). This stress 
could lead to worse health and even increased mental and physical health care consumption 
(Elbers et al., 2013). In other studies, medical assessors were said to reinforce the sick role and 
exacerbate the trauma by over-investigating patients (Harris, 2007; Lippel, 2007; Littleton et 
al., 2011; Murgatroyd, Cameron, & Harris, 2011). It could be argued that medical assessments 
can be adversarial. 
 
Assessment of damages involves determining the economic and non-economic losses that the 
injured person suffers because of the accident. Economic losses can be, for example, medical 
costs - although in some countries medical costs are covered by health insurance -, loss of 
income, transportation costs, or household support. In some jurisdictions, lawyer costs are also 
covered. Non-economic loss is primarily compensation for pain and suffering. In a fault-based 
scheme, people can claim economic and non-economic losses. In a no-fault scheme, injured 
people are often eligible to claim for compensation for economic losses only. In a fault-based 
scheme, economic losses are mainly individually determined, leaving room for discussion and 
negotiation, whereas in a no-fault scheme, economic losses are often pre-determined and 
calculated, leaving less room for discussion. More room for discussion can lead to polarisation 
and disputes between the injured person and the compensation agency.  
 
A factor related to the assessment of compensable damages is the frequency in which the 
compensation is paid. In fault-based schemes, compensation is often paid as a lump-sum 
amount at claim settlement. In a no-fault scheme, compensation payments are often made 
intermittently (for example, paid every two weeks). Periodic payments may have a more 
positive influence on claimants’ recovery compared to lump-sum payments (Grant & Studdert, 
2009). One study found that claimants who received lump sum payments reported greater 
psychological disturbance and more unemployment than those who were paid intermittently 
(Greenough & Fraser, 1989). An explanation could be that lump-sum payments may involve a 
degree of financial insecurity and stress.  
 
The final distinction is the type of insurer. Fault-based compensation schemes are typically 
third-party compensation schemes. This means that the injured person deals with the insurance 
company of the wrongdoer. No-fault schemes are typically first-party compensation schemes, 
meaning that the injured person claims at his/her own insurance company (Carroll et al., 2011; 
Fronsko, 2001). Third-party for-profit insurance companies have a stronger financial incentive 
to minimise the costs of compensation for the injured person, as the injured person is not their 
client. This may influence their actions. Injured persons might have less trust in for-profit, third-
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party insurance companies, which could lead to poorer perceived fairness and more adversarial 
interactions(Elbers et al., 2016). 
 
4. The effect of duration, litigation, and claim settlement 
 
In additional to compensation scheme design, three other overarching compensation claim 
factors have been reported to affect claimants’ health. The first is the duration of the 
compensation process. A long lasting compensation process is argued to be a factor causing 
psychological harm (Shuman, 2000). Another study showed that psychological distress in those 
with a musculoskeletal injury was associated with significantly longer settlement times (Guest, 
Tran, Gopinath, Cameron, Craig, 2017). Compensation processes take much longer than most 
people expect. On average, a minor claim can take one to two years (Gopinath, Elbers, Jagnoor, 
Harris, Nicholas… Cameron, 2016). A quantitative study empirically showed that being 
involved in a compensation process of longer than one year increased the trauma (Cotti, 
Magalhaes, da Costa, & Matos, 2004). However, in contrast, a meta-analysis of 211 studies did 
not find an effect of length of time on health (Harris et al. 2005).  
 
The second overarching claim factor is involvement in litigation/court procedure. In general, 
the majority of the compensation cases are settled out-of-court. The matters that come to court 
are cases in which the dispute has risen, which may imply that these cases are more adversarial 
for injured people. However, the court can also have a positive effect on well-being, because of 
its procedural justice elements. One study showed that people who were involved in litigation 
processes were more traumatised than those in out-of-court settlements (Cotti et al. 2004). A 
meta-analysis analysing 211 studies, however, did not show a health difference between 
claimants in litigation procedures and those involved in out-of-court settlements (Harris, 
Mulford, Solomon, van Gelder, & Young, 2005).  
 
Thirdly, it is frequently suggested that a claim settlement can have an effect on health. Claim 
settlement has been reported to ‘cure’ the victim (Miller, 1961), implying that once claimants 
receive their compensation, they miraculously recover from their injury. Some studies indeed 
found supportive evidence, as some showed that people with settled claims reported better 
health compared to those with pending claims (Guest & Drummond, 1992), whereas other 
studies did not show a correlation between claim settlement and mental health or recovery 
(Blanchard et al., 1998; Mendelson, 1995). 
 
 
5. The effect of legal professionals involved in the compensation process 
 
Empirical studies also suggested that legal professionals may have a negative effect on the 
claimants’ well-being. Two major types of legal professionals are involved in the compensation 
system: lawyers and claims managers3.  
                                               
3 The term ‘legal professionals’ is used to indicate professionals that are involved in the compensation 
settlement. Used in that way, claims managers are legal professionals; they not always have a legal background 
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The compensation process is an out-of-court process, for which it is not required to involve a 
lawyer. It could be assumed that most lawyers get involved because a dispute arises, or because 
people need help and expertise in an unfamiliar procedure. However, according to recent 
research among claimants in the Netherlands (n=12,679), the main reasons why injured people 
have legal assistance is because they were insured for it (42.5%) (Becx, Elbers, Van Wees, 
Leferink, Akkermans, unpublished document). The involvement of lawyers varies. For 
example, 13% of claimants involved a lawyer in the no-fault scheme in Victoria versus 67% of 
the claimants in the – at that time4 – fault-based scheme NSW Australia (Elbers et al., 2016). 
Interestingly, several studies found that lawyer involvement is negatively associated with 
claimants’ well-being (Gun et al., 2005; Harris, Murgatroyd, Cameron, Young, & Solomon, 
2009). One study did not find an association (Casey, Feyer, & Cameron, 2011). Explanations 
why lawyers are associated with worse health outcomes also vary. Some researchers suggest 
that lawyer involvement is associated with poorer health, because people with more severe 
injuries are more likely to involve a lawyer. However, studies that controlled for injury severity 
still found a negative effect (Harris, Young, Rae, Jalaludin, & Solomon, 2008). Others 
suggested that lawyers implicitly may encourage their clients to maintain sickness behaviour 
(Aurbach, 2011), or that lawyers inflict harm by not taking into account their clients’ emotions 
and non-material needs sufficiently (Akkermans, 2009).  
 
The other major category of professional in the compensation process is the claims manager. 
Claims managers are directly in contact with the injured person, unless a lawyer is involved. 
Claims managers often fulfil the role of critical decision-making. They make an assessment as 
to whether they approve a requested treatment, they determine (duration of) income 
replacement payments, and whether the injured person is eligible to get other services. Several 
studies have investigated the effect of claims management actions on patient outcomes. The 
most comprehensive evidence comes from a systematic review on the interaction between 
injured workers and insurers (Kilgour, Kosny, McKenzie, & Collie, 2014). In the above review 
it was shown that claims managers were most often associated with having a negative impact 
on the claimants’ health (Kilgour et al., 2014). Injured people often considered the interaction 
with the claims manager adversarial, for example because they felt that the claims manager did 
not take them seriously, did not listen to their story, and did not treat them with respect (Elbers, 
Akkermans, et al., 2015; Kilgour et al., 2014). Injured people were shown to develop a strong 
sense of injustice by having to justify themselves and having to prove that their injuries are real, 
being subjected to various medical exams and private investigators (Grant, O’Donnell, Spittal, 
Creamer, & Studdert, 2014). Also, the lack of communication (for example, not answering 
phone calls) or using difficult jargon in their letters has been found to be stressful and harmful 
(Elbers, Akkermans, et al., 2015; Kilgour et al., 2014). People can feel financially dependent 
on the system. Financial dependency worsened when claims managers ceased, changed or made 
late payments without notifying the injured people (Elbers, Akkermans, et al., 2015; Kilgour et 
al., 2014). However,  Kilgour et al (2014) also found that claims managers can have positive 
effect on claimants. This was when injured people found their claims manager to be respectful 
                                               
4 The study was conducted in 2015. In 2017 NSW has changed to a no-fault system. 
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and understanding, providing continuous contact and personalised service, receiving clear 
explanations and answers to questions, timely payment of income benefits and payments to 
medical providers, and prompt referrals for medical services and re-employment assistance, 
adopting a supportive problem-solving approach (Kilgour et al., 2014).  
 
Other evidence of how claims management can have a positive impact health comes from 
intervention studies. The first published study that investigated the impact of a change in claims 
handling on the health of injured people is a study conducted in NSW (Schaafsma, De Wolf, 
Kayaian, & Cameron, 2012). The change in claims handling consisted of, among others, better 
communication, early intervention, psychological screening, and focusing on early return to 
work. The study showed that an improved claims handling resulted in injured people being 
more likely to go back to usual activities 7 months post-traffic injury (Schaafsma et al., 2012). 
At a conference on injury compensation schemes in Adelaide in 2015, several non-academic 
studies were presented showing an effect of changes in claims management. For example, in 
South Australia, a new proactive claims management strategy (‘how can I help you?’), 
including mobile case management, early intervention, and legislative reform resulted in a 30% 
improvement in health and return outcomes in injured workers (G. McCarthy, 2015). In another 
study, simplification of communication, such as reducing the amount of text, moving legislation 
to the back of letters, removing unnecessary letters, consistent messaging focusing on recovery 
and returning to work, and asking workers to make personal commitments to support their 
return to work, resulted in 27% RTW improvement overall in injured workers (Smith, Collins, 
& Qiao, 2015). 
 
III. THE FUTURE OF COMPENSATION SYSTEMS 
 
Finally, what is the future of compensation systems? What are the methodological advances to 
accurately test compensation systems and policy implications in the future? Based on the 
research about (best practice) scheme design, the ideal scheme is being presented.  
 
 
6. Methodological advances and policy implications 
  
There are considerable ethical and practical challenges associated with research in applied 
injury compensation and rehabilitation systems. Firstly, the sheer complexity of services, 
legislation, injuries, and individual circumstances of people who pass through them mean that 
comparison of ‘treatment’ and ‘control’ groups is difficult; road injury can strike almost anyone 
and the mental and physical injuries sustained are often diverse requiring vastly different 
financial and time resources to treat. Secondly, from a policy or management perspective, there 
are restrictions on what is possible to provide within legislative boundaries that govern the 
system. Finally, identifying and quantifying the effect of key management settings to which 
improvements or detriments in performance can be attributed is also difficult. As a simple 
example, a rehabilitation system with a total of just 20 management policies or processes, each 
with three potential settings has 3^20, or nearly 3 and a half billion potential policy 
combinations it could test.  
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While we now know how damaging particular interactions with injury compensation and 
rehabilitation can be, there remains scarce publicly available evidence related to the effects of 
changing system processes or design. This may be due to a few reasons. 1) Insurance companies 
may not be keen to have their practice changed, 2) they do change their practice but do not 
adequately investigate the effect on injured person’s health, or 3) they do investigate the effect 
of scheme design and processes on outcomes but do not publish their findings due to 
commercial or other reasons. This last point is understandable from an individual company’s 
perspective, however, if knowledge of successful practice interventions can also be applied to 
others through more open and accessible communication of results, then companies, injured 
people, and the broader community all stand to benefit. Despite these challenges, there is a need 
for more intervention research and the development of innovative research designs that can 
assist to answer questions related to the health impacts of various compensation and 
rehabilitation system policy, management and intervention scenarios. Fortunately, a number of 
innovative research projects and programs have recently been enacted, with encouraging 
results. 
 
One recent innovation comes from the field of computational social science where simulated 
compensation and rehabilitation systems have been generated (Thompson, McClure, & 
DeSilva, 2017). Termed ‘SimSchemes’, these virtual policy and management laboratories have 
been co-designed with compensation and rehabilitation system managers and developed using 
agent-based modelling to enable various policy directions and scenarios to be tested in a safe, 
off-line environment. Recently applied to a ‘no-fault’ scheme in Australia, Thompson et al. 
(2017) tested the performance of the SimScheme in response to a set of 9 policy scenarios to 
determine short, medium and longer-term effects on a population of injured clients across health 
system performance principles described above; responsiveness to client expectations, fair 
financial contribution, and overall population health (see Figure 2). The 9 policy scenarios 
tested were:  
 
1) Improving the effectiveness and quality of services available to patients through payment for 
‘premium’ healthcare where effectiveness increased alongside investment; 2) Reducing 
approval rate of services by rehabilitation coordinators (i.e., reducing the approval rate of 
requested services by rehabilitation coordinators from 90% to 70%); 3) Early intervention (i.e., 
rehabilitation coordinators actively sought out patients with claim durations of < 30 days in 
order to provide access to services sooner), 4) Improving patient access to health services (i.e., 
increasing the number of existing services that accept compensable patients from 80% to 
100%); 5) Improving road safety (i.e., reducing incoming patients through investment in 
increased safety measures resulting in 10% reduced road trauma); 6) Improving availability of 
rehabilitation coordinators (i.e., increasing numbers of rehabilitation coordination staff by 10% 
from 300 to 330); 7) Increasing pre-approval rates (i.e., doubling the number of services that 
could be pre-approved for patients from 12 to 24 before being required to return to rehabilitation 
coordinators to request further treatment); 8) Reducing eligibility of services (i.e., increasing 
the threshold of injury severity for patients being eligible to receive services from the insurer); 




Figure 2. Overall performance of SimScheme system at simulation conclusion across 
elements of responsiveness, fair financial contribution, and overall health under each policy 
scenario, ranked from left to right in terms of effectiveness. 
 
The value of these models appears to be delivered in 3 main areas. Firstly, the flexibility of the 
models enables scheme managers and policy makers to model multiple interactions and 
proposed effects that extend over time and far beyond what can be reasonably imagined or 
thought through by any individual person or team (Sterman, 2006). In this respect, the model 
can act as a means of intelligence amplification (Vinge & Euchner, 2017) for decision-makers, 
where the combined expertise of contributors to the model design can be combined and 
considered in one schema. Similarly, it enables the consideration of various system 
performance criteria to be monitored at the same time, throughout the running of the model. 
This enhances understanding by various system participants of trade-offs or compromises that 
high performance in individual parts of the system may have on alternative aspects of measured 
performance. A simple example relates to the reduction of recovery durations among injured 
clients. By simply increasing the injury severity thresholds that clients require to receive on-
going medical treatment paid for by the simulated compensation system, immediate benefits 
can be observed in average durations of care. Whilst this produces a short-term financial 
benefit, ultimately, the system is left with a cohort of clients with even poorer health, who have 
longer durations of care on average, who are less satisfied with the services they receive, and 
who have higher per-person medical care costs. Total scheme performance is therefore 
compromised. 
 
The second advantage appears to be in the co-design element of the model, itself. Working 
closely with scheme managers, the computational models often require implicit assumptions of 
‘how the system works’, to be made explicit for the model to run. This process requires either 
agreement or understanding to be reached by managers who may have not previously realised 
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they understood the system to operate differently from one another. Alternatively, if consensus 
cannot be reached, it enables experimentation to be performed under the explicit working 
hypotheses of each manager or group. When differences of opinion or knowledge gaps are 
revealed through this process, this can further lead to identification of areas for investigation 
by more traditional means. 
 
Lastly, results provided by the models often provide insight into unusual system behaviour that 
cannot, could not, or was not predicted ahead of time through analysis of model inputs, alone. 
Examples from Thompson et al. (2017) relate to the initial short-term degradation of key system 
performance metrics that then corrected over time. For example, while two policies of early 
intervention and providing early access to care in the simulated system were expected to reduce 
mean client recovery durations through ensuring simulated clients received the timeliest 
treatment possible, initial measures immediately after policy implementation indicated that 
mean recovery durations for the overall population increased (see Figure 3). So why did 
providing early intervention and access to care initially increase the mean recovery durations 
of the overall population? 
 
In hindsight, this system behaviour was easily explained; clients with short claim durations 
were exiting the system, leaving only those with long durations behind. With a higher 
proportion of ‘long tail’ clients in the system, the mean recovery durations were pushed higher. 
However, without the modelling exercise providing a preview of likely effects on overall 
system performance, initiation of a similar policy in a ‘real’ system alongside like performance 
decrements may lead managers to believe that such policies were doomed to fail before they 
had sufficient time to play-out. 
 
 
Figure 3. Mean recovery duration among patients in the simulated health system from time-
step 250 to 1500 under each policy scenario. 
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The potential of such low-investment, system-oriented models using agent-based or other 
techniques such as system dynamics to reduce uncertainty (Milliken, 1987) or amplify 
intelligence  in decision-making, is compelling. This may especially be the case within real-
world compensation and rehabilitation systems where executives and managers often cannot 
wait for the conclusion of longitudinal studies, natural experiments, or medical or treatment 
trials to take place before taking action. Whilst far from providing a crystal ball view into the 
future, when fueled by a combination of established empirical evidence and local-level 
expertise, transparently built, tested, replicated, challenged, recorded, and iterated models such 
as SimScheme may prove themselves useful (Box, 1976; Epstein, 2008) in designing ideal 
schemes of tomorrow. 
 
7. Ideal scheme 
 
The design of an “ideal” scheme is important as an example of what might be achieved to assist 
recovery of people injured in motor vehicle crashes. However, it is recognised that insurance 
schemes do not exist in isolation from other systems and factors that also influence health. The 
reality also is that an “ideal” scheme design will not be seen as ideal by all stakeholders and 
will be resisted through political or corporate processes. In addition, schemes with good 
qualities are usually eroded over time and become financially non-viable. As a result, there is 
change that can be positive but can also be negative based on prevailing political factors. 
 
It is generally accepted that an “ideal” scheme would encourage early treatment and return to 
usual activities (including work). Thus, it is likely to be “no fault”, because if fault is to be 
determined, it will be more adversarial. Guidelines should be in place to provide appropriate 
treatment with a minimum of delay, for example through pre-approval of evidence based 
treatments. Guidelines should also aim to limit access to treatments that are clearly not effective 
or are likely to be associated with greater, or longer periods of, disability.  
 
Early treatment would also be encouraged by early notification, that is, a claim is made soon 
after injury. Claims management practices would be structured to ensure clear and timely 
communication with injured people. As far as possible, dispute resolution processes should be 
seen as fair, and formal disputes should be avoided through informal resolution processes. An 
ideal scheme should also manage those with psychological disorder in a more professional 
manner, applying early screening and offering early access to evidence based treatment (Guest, 
Tran, Gopinath, Cameron & Craig, 2018). 
 
The “ideal” scheme should also have (or lack) other characteristics that may considered 
controversial. Non-economic loss payments (that is payments for “pain and suffering”) should 
not be part of the scheme, or should be subject to high thresholds so that only a small percentage 
of claimants will reach those thresholds. High lawyer activity within a scheme is also likely to 
extend the duration of claims and hinder recovery. Thus, there should be regulations that limit 
lawyer activity, perhaps only to people with very severe injuries, or to cap the fees that lawyers 
can charge. The reasons to limit lawyer activity are to reduce adversariality and to limit explicit, 
or implicit, incentives to greater disability. Further, high degrees of lawyer activity should be 
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avoided on the account that it can create ‘lock-in’ where positive policy change for injured 
clients is potentially hindered by perceived threats to existing legal business models.  
 
For an “ideal” scheme, economic loss payments also should be set at levels that are fair but also 
encourage return to usual activities, particularly work, as soon as is feasible. The reason is that 
returning to work, or usual activities, is internationally accepted as being positive for health. 
There are a wide variety of levels of income replacement specified in different insurance 
schemes. In general, it is accepted that there should be close to full income replacement for a 
period of about three months after injury and then a significant step down (often to 80% of 
usual income) to encourage return to work. Special arrangements are usually put in place for 
people with very severe injuries. 
 
As has been noted earlier in this chapter, there is very limited direct research evidence about 
what can be done to assist schemes in achieving better outcomes for injured people. Hence, 
while general characteristics of better schemes can be defined, there is uncertainty about the 




In these final years of the Decade of Action for Road Safety, compensation and rehabilitation 
systems have an opportunity to optimise their design. Consistent with WHO guidelines for the 
effective management of broader health systems, this requires the enactment of settings and 
structures that optimise the physical, mental and functional health of injured clients, maximises 
the responsiveness of systems to clients’ non-medical needs, and ensures the ongoing 
financially sustainability of compensation and rehabilitation systems. However, we contend 
that presently, there is undue emphasis placed on the latter of these components and a re-
balancing of the purpose of injury compensation and rehabilitation systems to focus on the 
rehabilitation needs of injured clients is required. Presently understood within a largely 
‘defensive’ insurance model that attempts to restrict outgoings on the basis of longer-term 
liability risk, we advocate that future models can re-orient themselves toward a more ‘active 
research and rehabilitation’ mindset, placing the client at the centre. 
  
It must be acknowledged that regulators and insurers will always face competing pressures of 
costs, governance, and service capacity. There is always more that can be done, and more that 
is being asked of insurers than can ever be delivered. However, schemes and rehabilitation 
system researchers can work together to explore what optimal compensation schemes would 
look like under these difficult conditions. We contend that managing financial sustainability 
through early identification of vulnerability, early intervention, and efficient, uncomplicated 
delivery of services, rather than their curtailment, delay or denial, is a good beginning. It is also 
highly encouraging to see some systems (Victorian Transport Accident Commission, 2016) 
beginning to embody these principles. Also New South Wales recently adopted a no-fault 
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